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HOW MAY THE UNITED STATES LEVERAGE ITS FATCA
IGA BILATERAL PROCESS TO INCENTIVIZE GOOD TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS AMONG THE WORLD OF BLACK HAT
AND GREY HAT GOVERNMENTS?
A CARROT & STICK POLICY PROPOSAL
William Byrnes ∗
A Carrot & Stick Policy Proposal
This Essay serves as a preliminary narrative to examine the serious
challenge of Control Firsters’ vision that every jurisdiction should have
complete information on all transactions by any taxpayer. 1 The world has
many, potentially a majority, of grey hat and black hat governments and tax
administrations. One measure of which governments fall into these categories
is Transparency International’s corruption index. 2 Of 167 countries ranked by
Transparency International for breadth of corruption from one hundred (very
clean) to zero (highly corrupt/failed state), only fifty countries ranked above a
score of fifty, and only twelve scored above eighty. 3 A question that Control
Firsters must address is whether it is prudent for taxpayers to trust the
∗ Executive Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law; Associate Dean, Special Projects.
This paper was presented at Cambridge’s 34th Annual Economic Crimes Symposium, Sept 4–11, 2016:
“Economic Crime—where does the buck stop? Who is responsible—facilitators, controllers and or their
advisers?” A Plenary to Explore the Topics Raised in Richard Gordon and Andrew Morriss’ article “Moving
Money: International Financial Flows, Taxes, & Money Laundering” on Saturday, September 10th 1:00–
13:00. A prior version of this Essay appeared as a blog post on Wolters Kluwer’s International Tax Blog.
William Byrnes, White, Grey and Black Hat Tax Administrators—A Proposal for a U.S. Carrot and Stick
Approach Part I, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Aug. 17, 2016), http://kluwertaxblog.com/2016/08/17/whitegrey-and-black-hat-tax-administrations-a-proposal-for-a-u-s-carrot-stick-approach-part-i-followed-by-acritical-fatca-update/.
1 See Richard Gordon & Andrew Morriss, Moving Money: International Financial Flows, Taxes, &
Money Laundering, 37 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 41, 57, 92–93 (2014). The “control first” view
(coined by Dr. Andrew Morriss and Dr. Richard Gordon) advocates “illegitimate without strict control.” Id.
at 4. “‘Control first’ advocates often begin by neglecting the benefits of free markets, and then overstate the
benefits of control while ignoring the costs of those controls.” Id. Dr. Andrew Morriss and Dr. Richard Gordon
developed an anti-thesis to “control firsters”—the “Efficient Enterprise” view. Id. The Efficient Enterprise
view requires including the benefits and costs of free markets, market abuse, and controls of market abuse, to
root out inefficient and wasteful regulation. Id.
2 Table of Results: Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.
transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
3 Id.
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governments of the 117 countries that scored a fifty or below on Transparency
International’s corruption index. Quite possibly, the complete information
system invoked by Control Firsters encourages, even prolongs, the bad
behavior by providing fuel (financial information) to feed the fire of corruption
and suppression of rivals.
By leveraging a “carrot-stick” policy tool, the United States has the
opportunity to incentivize these bad actors to adopt best tax administration
practices by offering reciprocal automatic exchange of information via the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Competent Authority
Agreements (CAA). 4 The carrot for foreign governments is that the United
States will provide the tax information about their tax residents’ assets in the
United States via the CAA. FATCA requires that the IRS be provided with
information about U.S. taxpayers by foreign financial institutions either
directly or via their governments. 5 The stick will be established by the U.S.
Congress adopting a Tax Administration Certification version of the former
Presidential Annual Narcotics Certification with its corresponding penalties.
Under the Drug Certification Requirements of the Drug Abuse Act, from
1987–2001, by November 1 of each year, the President designated major illicit
drug producing and drug transit countries, known formerly as annual narcotics
certification. 6 The President was then required to withhold fifty percent of U.S.
assistance for the designated countries for the fiscal year. 7 By March 1 of each
year, the U.S. Department of State prepared, by country, an assessment of the
efforts to suppress the international drug trade and money laundering,
published to Congress as the “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report”
(INCSR). 8
By March 1, countries that the President had not yet certified as either fully
cooperating in U.S. drug control efforts or that had not taken adequate steps to
achieve the 1988 United Nations (U.N.) Drug Convention objectives incurred a
ratcheting of U.S. penalties. 9 The potential sanctions included:

4

Gordon & Morriss, supra note 1, at 41.
Id.
6 K. LARRY STORRS, CONG. RES. SERV., RL32038, DRUG CERTIFICATION/DESIGNATION PROCEDURES
FOR ILLICIT NARCOTICS PRODUCING AND TRANSIT COUNTRIES 2 (2003).
7 Id.
8 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 §489, 22 U.S.C. §2291(j) (1961) (amended 2006). For a list of the
annual reports see Narcotics Control Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
9 STORRS, supra note 6, at 1.
5
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(1) most foreign assistance and financing of military sales for the
decertified country were suspended . . . ; (2) U.S. representatives
were required to vote against loans for the country in the multilateral
development banks; and (3) certain trade sanctions, including
increased tariffs and denial of preferential trade benefits, could be
applied at the President’s discretion. 10

The President held the authority, albeit subject to a Congressional veto by
majority vote, to annually waive the application of the sanctions in the national
interest. 11 Otherwise, the imposed sanctions remained in force until the country
was subsequently certified. 12
Black and grey hat actors (commonly referred to as “secrecy jurisdictions”)
that do not provide this information to the United States are effectively cut off
from the U.S. financial markets—the United States imposes the thirty percent
Chapter 4 (FATCA) withholding on the gross proceeds of many types of
payments, such as for the sale of shares and bonds, and all types of passive
income. 13 Pursuant to this policy proposal, Chapter 4 withholding should be
extended to nefarious tax administrations that misuse tax information provided
by the United States. Moreover, this proposal calls on Congress to enact
legislation establishing a legal requirement that the Treasury annually assess
by country tax administration and report to Congress by March 1. 14 Instead of
reinventing the wheel for the methodology of the assessment or undertaking
work recently completed, the U.S. Treasury may borrow from the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) peer review process
for tax information exchange and add to the OECD assessment a new Part B
“Protection of Taxpayer Information.” Alternatively, the United States should
encourage the OECD to adopt a Part B evaluation of protection of taxpayer
information, albeit on an annual basis, and then the Treasury could draw from
these assessments.
The FATCA Train Has Left the Station
The United States has a highly successful international financial service
industry that is important to the U.S. economy. This is exemplified by, firstly,

10

Id. at 2.
Id.
12 Id.
13 For an in-depth analysis of FATCA, see William Byrnes & Robert J. Munro, Background and Current
Status of FATCA, in 4 LEXISNEXIS GUIDE TO FATCA COMPLIANCE 1 (4th ed., 2016).
14 See STORRS, supra note 6, at 1.
11
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the international financial centers, such as Miami and New York, having over
half a trillion dollars of foreign deposits of high net wealth individuals, many
of whom experts allege are not tax and exchange control compliant in their
home countries. 15 Secondly, with over 900,000 companies registered in its
jurisdiction, Delaware is second to Hong Kong, and ahead of British Virgin
Islands in the number of companies incorporated there. 16 Thirdly, U.S.
territories’ offshore regimes, like the U.S. Virgin Islands, reduce the effective
U.S. corporate and income tax rates below 3.5 percent. 17
In 2011, 133,297 businesses incorporated in Delaware. 18 “Delaware has
more corporate entities . . . than people—945,326 to 897,934.” 19 These
absentee corporate residents account for a quarter of Delaware’s total budget,
roughly $860 million in taxes and fees in 2011. 20 Moreover, the economic
spillover impact for Delaware includes substantial employment and
professional fees to Delaware businesses participating in the incorporation and
advisory industry. The State of Delaware does not maintain a corporate
registry of beneficial owners. 21
Thus, there has been a lot of noise about the potential “giant sucking sound
of foreign direct investment (FDI) exiting the U.S. financial markets, like a
swirl through a drain,” because of the imposition of FATCA withholding or
because the United States provides information to foreign governments. 22 But
15

Nicholas Nehamas, Miami Banks on Future as a Financial Hub, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 16, 2015, 2:58
PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article10468874.html.
16 William Byrnes, Commentary on the Panama Papers Disclosing 14,000 Clients’ 214,000 Companies
Files: Tax Evasion, Political Corruption, and FIFA Connections, INT’L FIN. L. PROF BLOG (Apr. 3, 2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/intfinlaw/2016/04/14000-client-offshore-files-leaked-from-mossackfonseca-the-panama-papers-disclosing-details-of-2140.html [hereinafter Byrnes, Commentary on the Panama
Papers].
17 Tax Incentives: How Do They Work?, U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS ECON. DEV. AUTHORITY,
http://usvieda.org/start-or-grow-business/edc-tax-incentives/tax-incentives-how-do-they-work (last visited Jan.
26, 2017) (the example ETR is 3.37% according to the U.S. Virgin Islands). See also WILLIAM H. BYRNES &
DR. ROBERT J MUNRO, TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD (LexisNexis 2016).
18 Leslie Wayne, How Delaware Thrives as a Corporate Tax Haven, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/business/how-delaware-thrives-as-a-corporate-tax-haven.html.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Libby Watson, Why Are There so Many Anonymous Companies in Delaware?, SUNLIGHT FOUND.
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2016/04/06/why-are-there-so-many-anonymous-corporations-indelaware/.
22 William Byrnes, White, Grey and Black Hat Tax Administrators—A Proposal for a U.S. Carrot and
Stick Approach Part I, KLUWER INT’L TAX BLOG (Aug. 17, 2016), http://kluwertaxblog.com/2016/08/17/
white-grey-and-black-hat-tax-administrations-a-proposal-for-a-u-s-carrot-stick-approach-part-i-followed-by-acritical-fatca-update/ [hereinafter Byrnes, Proposal for U.S. Carrot and Stick Approach Part I].
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the FDI numbers published by the Bureau of Economic Statistics suggest a
different conclusion: “Expenditures by foreign direct investors to acquire,
establish, or expand U.S. businesses totaled $420.7 billion in 2015, an increase
of 68 percent from 2014, when expenditures were $250.6 billion.” 23 Arguably,
the United States may have received more FDI and its financial markets may
have grown faster without FATCA. But a suppressed FDI is a price Congress
decided it was willing to pay to clamp down on access to the financial
information of U.S. taxpayers regardless of location.
The World is Full of Black Hat and Grey Hat Governments and Tax
Administrations
Foreign countries also want to receive financial information about their
taxpayers from the United States. For the vast majority of countries, more of
their taxpayers’ assets are held through the United States than vice versa. “The
Protocol amending the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters will lead to substantially more transnational identity
theft, crime, industrial espionage, financial fraud, and suppression of political
opponents and religious or ethnic minorities by authoritarian and corrupt
governments, including Russia, China, Colombia, and Nigeria.” 24 The over
200 countries and jurisdictions of the world are led by governments, some of
which—when it comes to tax administration—are black hat. 25 For these
purposes, black hat is a government that uses tax administration and the
information derived therefrom against the citizens or against foreign
competitors. 26 Tax administrators may selectively use tax information against
political rivals (for example, accusations made against Russia 27 and
Venezuela). 28 Some governments are ridden with criminal gangs (accusations

23 New Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 2014 and 2015, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS (July
13, 2016), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/fdi/2016/fdi0716.htm.
24 David Burton, Two Little Known Tax Treaties Will Lead to Substantially More Identity Theft, Crime,
Industrial Espionage, and Suppression of Political Dissidents, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/12/two-little-known-tax-treaties-will-lead-to-substantiallymore-identity-theft-crime-industrial-espionage-and-suppression-of-political-dissidents.
25 Byrnes, Proposal for U.S. Carrot and Stick Approach Part I, supra note 22.
26 Id.
27 Masha Gessen, The Wrath of Putin, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 2012), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/
politics/2012/04/vladimir-putin-mikhail-khodorkovsky-russia.
28 Arthur Brice, Venezuela Takes Action Against Critical TV Station, CNN (June 5, 2009, 5:05 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/06/05/venezuela.tvstation.owner/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD.
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laid against Mexico), 29 or perhaps the government itself is the criminal gang
(for example, accusations against Venezuela). 30 Some governments are
accused of using nefarious means such as theft and espionage to obtain
business information about foreign competitors on behalf of national
champions. The United States has accused China and China has, in turn,
accused the United States. 31
This Protocol isn’t limited to decent places like Canada and the
U.S.—though even if it were, giving so much power to the tax
agencies of the world is a bad idea. The Protocol includes wildly
corrupt places like Albania and Azerbaijan, dictatorships with
aggressive intelligence services and a history of cyber thefts like
China and Russia, and lots of places like Kazakhstan and Tunisia,
which can’t hope to protect the information we send them, even if
they don’t intentionally misuse it. None of their promises is worth
anything. 32

Some governments are grey hat and do not protect tax information. Grey hat
governments lack the capacity to do so because of a lack of resources or a lack
of will. 33 As an example, some countries do not consider tax information
confidential and even publish tax information publicly. 34 For example, grey hat
governments may allow tax information to be stolen by cyber criminals. 35
Grey hat tax administrators pass the information to other government
29

Alfredo Corchado, Drug Cartels Taking Over Government Roles in Parts of Mexico, DALLAS NEWS
(Apr. 2011), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas/2011/04/30/drug-cartels-taking-over-government-rolesin-parts-of-mexico.
30 Philip Sherwell, Venezuela: A Land of Political Killings and Gang Turf Wars, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 11,
2014, 3:05 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/venezuela/11156035/Venezuelaa-land-of-political-killings-and-gang-turf-wars.html.
31 See David Burton, Do You Want Your Private Financial Information Automatically Shared with
Russia or China?, DAILY SIGNAL (July 23, 2014), http://dailysignal.com/2014/07/23/want-private-financialinformation-automatically-shared-russian-chinese-governments/.
32 Ted Bromund, Let’s Send Your Tax Forms to China, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 2, 2016),
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2016/6/lets-send-your-tax-forms-to-china.
33 Byrnes, Proposal for U.S. Carrot and Stick Approach Part I, supra note 22.
34 The United States published tax returns and taxpayer information until 1936 and did not have a law
protecting taxpayer information until the Watergate scandal. Mark Berggren, I.R.C. 6103: Let’s Get to the
Source of the Problem, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 825, 830–31 (1999). Not all U.S. taxpayer information is
confidential. Some states publish state taxpayer information, especially resulting from delinquencies (“name
and shame”). Stan Veuger, Named and Shamed, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 19, 2015, 9:00 AM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/02/19/shaming-delinquent-taxpayers-only-getsyou-so-far. Many state property tax authorities publish property roles with property value, assessed tax, and
owner’s name. See, e.g., Delinquent Taxpayers, WIS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://www.revenue.wi.gov/faqs/
ise/topdelin.html#list4 (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
35 Byrnes, Proposal for U.S. Carrot and Stick Approach Part I, supra note 22.
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departments, against the rule for an exchange of information. 36 Grey hat
governments may leak taxpayer information to the press (Japan is accused of
using this tactic against U.S. taxpayers, with IRS complicity). 37
In addition to having a legal framework, administrative capacity and
processes in place to ensure the confidentiality of the information
received, the technical and organizational ability of the participating
States to gather information within their own jurisdiction is of utmost
importance. This might entail a challenge especially to developing
countries and economies in transition. ICC calls upon the UN to
provide capacity building and technical assistance, especially to
developing countries and economies in transition, by establishing a
technical platform—including meetings, seminars and other capacity
building or technical assistance events—to allow for swift
implementation of AEOI in a secure and cost effective way. 38

Thomson Reuters Foundation published an interview of Pascal Saint Amans,
Director of the OECD’s Tax Policy Directorate:
The ability of a developing country to safeguard confidentiality of the
financial information it receives from abroad was one challenge that
Saint-Amans highlighted.
....
“You have a request from the government on the main opponent in
the country. . . in that case, you know there are risks of leakage of the
information or misuse of the information,” Saint Amans [sic] said.
“Automatic exchange of information is radically different because
the bank collects the information and sends it automatically to other
countries; therefore the risks of misuse of the information are pretty
high.
“That’s why you shouldn’t engage with automatic exchange of
information with a country unless that country has ‘Chinese Walls’ in

36

Id.
Eric Kroh, Ariz. Judge Docks U.S. $3,000 For Disclosing Taxpayer Info, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:16
PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/620920/ariz-judge-docks-u-s-3-000-for-disclosing-taxpayer-info. See
Aloe Vera of America, Inc. v. U.S., No. 15-15672, 2015 LEXIS 16605 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2015).
38 Letter from Dr. Christian Kaeser, Chair, Int’l Camber of Commerce Comm’n on Taxation, to Michael
Lennard, Chief, U.N. Int’l Tax Cooperation Section (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/
tenthsession/LetterICC_perspectivesTHE.pdf.
37
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all its procedures to protect the confidentiality of the information,”
Saint-Amans added. 39

In a 2013 article, the Economist pointed to the challenge of managing the
potentially vast amount of information received from automatic information
requests:
Another problem with automatic exchange is the huge quantities of
data it produces. Europe’s tax authorities have struggled to stay on
top of the information swapped under the directive. An official from
a British dependency taking part in the EUSD reportedly complained
that some countries which receive encrypted DVDs with client
information do not even get round to asking for the decryption key.
A further concern is the risk of misuse of information by corrupt
administrations, or rogue government employees, such as the sale of
personal financial data to would-be kidnappers. Global automatic
exchange is “a developed-world solution for a global economy
unsuited to it”, argues Geoff Cook of Jersey Finance. Some
developing countries lack the administration to deal with it, says
Gurbachan Singh, a tax lawyer in Singapore. In places like Indonesia
“you may have a tax officer but not a proper tax office.” 40

The Financial Transparency Coalition argues not to require small countries to
collect and share information because these do not have staff capacity,
financial resources, or systems in place. However, these countries want to
receive tax information from the developed economies under the guise that
additional tax collections will allow the capacity building necessary to offer
developed economy protections and create required data collection systems.
The Financial Transparency Coalition states in an article:
While this requirement may sound sensible, the reciprocity clause is
problematic for some developing countries that don’t have the
technological capacity or the staff to compile the information. Often,
an entire country may have just one or two employees devoted to
international tax issues. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, would

39 Luke Balleny, Developing Countries Not Ready to Join Tax Evasion Crackdown—OECD, THOMSON
REUTERS FOUND. (May 26, 2014, 9:15 A.M.), http://news.trust.org//item/20140526065643-2fhq7/.
40 Automatic Response: The Way to Make Exchange of Tax Information Work, ECONOMIST (Feb. 16,
2013, 4:06 PM), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21571561-way-make-exchange-tax-informationwork-automatic-response.
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need to add roughly 650,000 tax administrators to reach average
global staffing levels. 41

Four Areas to Assess a Tax Administration’s Handling of Information
Protection of tax information should involve four fundamental areas of
concern (and assessment):
(1) Tax information used by a foreign government for political purpose.
(2) Governments that leak confidential tax information, by example to
the media or to national competitors, 42 to gain an advantage against
a taxpayer.
(3) Corrupt governments (for example, narco governments) or corrupt
government staff (mafia, narco gangs) using information criminally
such as for extortion, for seeking protection money and bribery, for
kidnapping of taxpayers, and for fraud against taxpayers.
(4) Porous governments unable to protect tax information from
electronic hacking.
The United States Must Lead by Example—Admit Failings, Seek
Improvement
The United States is itself no stranger to at least three of the four above
concerns for protecting taxpayer information.
Regarding the first concern of tax information being used for political gain,
the United States has experienced its share of the IRS being used for political
gain by the President’s office against opponents. Presidents Kennedy and
Nixon are often referred to but by no means exclusively. 43 Nixon’s Watergate
scandal led to the U.S. law against disclosure of taxpayer information. 44
Congress enacted Section 6103 to ensure that tax returns and tax return
information must be kept confidential, unless a statutory exception applies. 45

41 Automatic Exchange Of Information, FIN. TRANSPARENCY COALITION, https://financialtransparency.
org/issues/automatic-tax-information-exchange/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
42 National champions may leverage country-by-country reporting information of a foreign (U.S.)
competitor to deconstruct the competitor’s profit margins, operating costs, and its supply chain.
43 Nicholas M. Horrock, Senate Unit Finds Tax Data Misuse by F.B.I. and C.I.A, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3,
1975),
http://www.nytimes.com/1975/10/03/archives/senate-unit-finds-tax-data-misuse-by-fbi-and-cia-revenueservice.html?_r=0.
44 See Berggren, supra note 34.
45 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1974).
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Section 6103 “was enacted in response to the use of tax return information for
political purposes revealed during Watergate.” 46
Several media outlets reported that in 2010, an employee of the state of
Delaware with access to state residents’ federal tax records accessed a
Senatorial candidate’s records. 47 The employee discovered a federal tax lien
attaching to property of the candidate (reported as an erroneous lien) and
leaked this information to the press in an attempt to embarrass her. 48
Regarding the second concern, in 2015, after more than fifteen years of
litigation, a federal court determined that the IRS, with respect to a transfer
pricing audit of a U.S. taxpayer, knowingly provided false information
concerning alleged tax evasion to a Japanese tax authority. 49 The foreign
authority leaked the alleged tax evasion to the local media, and the taxpayer’s
business in that country suffered accordingly. 50 The taxpayer alleged that the
IRS knew or should have known that the foreign tax authority regularly leaked
taxpayer information to the media. 51
Regarding the fourth concern, from January 1, 2014 to May 21, 2015,
cybercriminals allegedly accessed tax account information of potentially
620,931 taxpayers and those cybercriminals were successful in obtaining
access to 355,262 of those taxpayers’ accounts. 52
The U.S. Treasury has far superior funding, resources, and will relative to
most of the world’s tax administrations to address these concerns. Thus, in the
best of circumstances if these concerns materialize in the United States, their
effects will be worse if they materialize in foreign countries.

46

Rueckert v. Internal Revenue Serv., 775 F.2d 208, 210 (7th Cir. 1985).
Ben Wolfgang & Dave Boyer, Former GOP Senate Candidate Christine O’Donnell Told Her Tax
Records Were Breached, WASH. TIMES (July 17, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/17/
former-gop-senate-candidate-christine-odonnell-tol/.
48 Id.
49 Aloe Vera of America et al. v. U.S., No. 15-15672, 2015 LEXIS 16605 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2015); Kroh,
supra note 37.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., TIGTA-2016-40-037, THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE DID NOT IDENTIFY AND ASSIST ALL INDIVIDUALS POTENTIALLY AFFECTED BY THE GET TRANSCRIPT
APPLICATION DATA BREACH (2016).
47
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U.S. Reciprocity For IGA Countries?
In response to the enactment of FATCA and other jurisdictions’ interest in
facilitating and participating in the exchange of financial account information,
the U.S. government entered into a number of bilateral IGAs that set the
groundwork for cooperation between the jurisdictions in this area. 53 Certain
IGAs not only enable the IRS to receive this information from Foreign
Financial Institutions, but enable more efficient exchange by allowing a
foreign jurisdiction tax administration to gather the specified information and
provide it to the IRS. 54 And some IGAs also require the IRS to reciprocally
exchange certain information about accounts maintained by residents of
foreign jurisdictions in U.S. financial institutions with their jurisdictions’ tax
authorities. Under these reciprocal IGAs, the first exchange had to take place
by September 30, 2015 giving the IRS a deadline to put in place a process to
facilitate this data exchange. 55
The information now available provides the United States and partner
jurisdictions an improved means of verifying the tax compliance of taxpayers
using offshore banking and investment facilities, and improves detection of
those who may attempt to evade reporting the existence of offshore accounts
and the income attributable to those accounts. The following is a list of
countries of residence for which the reporting requirement applies:
1. Antigua & Barbuda

31. Greece

61. Netherlands island territories:
Bonaire, Saba, and St. Eustatius

2. Aruba

32. Grenada

62. New Zealand

3. Australia

33. Guernsey

63. Norway

4. Austria

34. Guyana

64. Pakistan

5. Azerbaijan

35. Honduras

65. Panama

6. Bangladesh

36. Hong Kong

66. Peru

7. Barbados

37. Hungary

67. Philippines

8. Belgium

38. Iceland

68. Poland

9. Bermuda

39. India

69. Portugal

10. Brazil

40. Indonesia

70. Romania

11. British Virgin Islands

41. Ireland

71. Russian Federation

12. Bulgaria

42. Isle of Man

72. Slovak Republic

53
54
55

I.R.S. News Release IR-2015-111 (Oct. 2, 2015).
Id.
Id.
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13. Canada

43. Israel

73. Slovenia

14. Cayman Islands

44. Italy

74. South Africa

15. China

45. Jamaica

75. Spain

16. Colombia

46. Japan

76. Sri Lanka

17. Costa Rica

47. Jersey

77. St. Maarten (Dutch part)

18. Croatia

48. Kazakhstan

78. Sweden

19. Curacao

49. Korea (South)

79. Switzerland

20. Cyprus

50. Latvia

80. Thailand

21. Czech Republic

51. Liechtenstein

81. Trinidad and Tobago

22. Denmark

52. Lithuania

82. Tunisia

23. Dominica

53. Luxembourg

83. Turkey

24. Dominican Republic

54. Malta

84. Ukraine

25. Egypt

55. Marshall Islands

85. United Kingdom

26. Estonia

56. Mauritius

86. Venezuela

27. Finland

57. Mexico

28. France

58. Monaco

29. Germany

59. Morocco

30. Gibraltar

60. Netherlands

[Vol. 31

The following is a list of countries with which the Treasury has determined that the
automatic exchange of deposit interest information is appropriate:
1. Australia

10. Italy

2. Canada

11. Jersey

3. Denmark

12. Malta

4. Finland

13. Mauritius

5. France

14. Mexico

6. Germany

15. Netherlands

7. Guernsey

16. Norway

8. Ireland

17. Spain

9. Isle of Man

18. United Kingdom

What Has the U.S. Treasury Promised?
In its implementation of the exchange of bank interest information
regulations with foreign governments, the U.S. Treasury promises to assess
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each country with which the United States has a FATCA Intergovernmental
Agreement (IGA), Tax Information Exchange Agreement (TIEA), and Double
Tax Agreement (DTA). 56 In that assessment, the Treasury determines whether
that country has proper protections and policies in place, and whether those
protections and policies are actually enforced, for the tax information sent by
the United States to it each year.
Revenue Procedure (Rev. Proc.) 2012-24, entitled “Implementation of
Nonresident Alien Deposit Interest Regulations,” states in its preamble:
The purpose of this revenue procedure is to list . . . the countries with
which the United States has in effect an income tax or other
convention or bilateral agreement relating to the exchange of
information. . . . As discussed in the preamble to the regulations, even
when such an agreement exists, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is
not compelled to exchange information, including information
collected pursuant to the regulations, if there is concern regarding the
use of the information or other factors exist that would make
exchange inappropriate. 57

The May 14, 2012 “Guidance on Reporting Interest Paid to Nonresident
Aliens” for the Rev. Proc. 2012-24 states in pertinent part:
Second, consistent with established international standards, all of the
information exchange agreements to which the United States is a
party require that the information exchanged under the agreement be
treated and protected as secret by the foreign government. In
addition, information exchange agreements generally prohibit foreign
governments from using any information exchanged under such an
agreement for any purpose other than the purpose of administering,
collecting, and enforcing the taxes covered by the agreement.
Accordingly, under these agreements, neither country is permitted to
release the information shared under the agreement or use it for any
other law enforcement purposes.
Third, consistent with the international standard for information
exchange and United States law, the United States will not enter into
an information exchange agreement unless the Treasury Department
and the IRS are satisfied that the foreign government has strict
confidentiality protections. Specifically, prior to entering into an
information exchange agreement with another jurisdiction, the
Treasury Department and the IRS closely review the foreign
56
57

See Rev. Proc. 2012-24, 2012-20 I.R.B.; Rev. Proc. 2014-64, 2014-53 I.R.B.
Rev. Proc. 2012-24, 2012-20 I.R.B. pmbl.
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jurisdiction’s legal framework for maintaining the confidentiality of
taxpayer information. In order to conclude an information exchange
agreement with another country, the Treasury Department and the
IRS must be satisfied that the foreign jurisdiction has the necessary
legal safeguards in place to protect exchanged information and that
adequate penalties apply to any breach of that confidentiality.
Finally, even if an information exchange agreement is in effect, the
IRS will not exchange information on deposit interest or otherwise
with a country if the IRS determines that the country is not
complying with its obligations under the agreement to protect the
confidentiality of information and to use the information solely for
collecting and enforcing taxes covered by the agreement. The IRS
also will not exchange any return information with a country that
does not impose tax on the income being reported because the
information could not be used for the enforcement of tax laws within
that country. 58

On December 29, 2014, the Treasury updated Rev. Proc. 2012-24,
“Implementation of Nonresident Alien Deposit Interest Regulations,” with
Rev. Proc. 2014-64. 59 This revenue procedure lists the countries with which
the United States has in effect an income tax or other convention or bilateral
agreement relating to the exchange of information pursuant to which the
United States agrees to provide, as well as receive, information. This revenue
procedure also lists, in Section 4, the countries with which the Treasury
Department has determined that it is appropriate to have an automatic
exchange relationship with respect to the reporting of certain deposit interest
paid to nonresident alien individuals on or after January 1, 2013. 60 In the case
of interest aggregating ten dollars or more paid to a nonresident alien
individual the payor is required to make an information return on Form 1042-S
for the calendar year in which the interest is paid. 61 The eighteen countries
include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Guernsey,
Ireland, Isle of Man, Italy, Jersey, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 62
Thus, the Treasury and the IRS have promised that the United States will
only engage in reciprocal exchange with foreign jurisdictions that, among other

58
59
60
61
62

T.D. 9584, 2012-20 I.R.B., 77 Fed. Reg. 23391.
Rev. Proc. 2014-64, 2014-53 I.R.B.
Id. at § 4.
Id. at § 2.
Id. at § 3.
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requirements, meet the IRS’s stringent safeguard, privacy, and technical
standards. 63 Before exchanging with a particular jurisdiction, the United States
conducted detailed reviews of that jurisdiction’s laws and infrastructure
concerning the use and protection of taxpayer data, cyber-security capabilities,
as well as its security practices and procedures. 64 Yet, there is no assurance
that IRS systems are secure. Nor is there any indication if the U.S. Treasury
would assume financial responsibility should disclosure of taxpayer
information to black hat or grey hat governments (or other nefarious actors)
cause financial losses or other damages. The U.S. Treasury has established a
website “Reporting Unauthorized Disclosure or Misuse of Tax Information
Exchanged Under an International Agreement.” 65
The IRS announced on October 2, 2015 that it achieved the exchange of
financial account information with certain foreign tax administrators. 66 This
was in keeping with a key September 30, 2015 FATCA target date. To have
achieved this promise, the IRS must have successfully and timely developed
the information system infrastructure, procedures, data use and confidentiality
safeguards, and means to access other countries’ developments thereof, to
protect taxpayer data while facilitating reciprocal automatic exchange of tax
information with these eighteen foreign jurisdiction tax administrators that
include Mexico. The American Bankers Association Comment Letter to the
U.S.-Mexico FATCA IGA states:
By including an automatic exchange provision in the U.S.-Mexico
IGA, it is difficult to see how the Treasury can honor its commitment
and promise to only provide information to Mexico after it has made
a determination (based on unknown factors) that Mexico is
complying with its obligations to protect the confidentiality of such
information. 67

The U.S. Congress should extend the State Department’s required process
to evaluate countries for assistance in the U.S. and global fight against
63

I.R.S. News Release, supra note 53.
FATCA – A Status Report, TGS GLOBAL BUS. NETWORK, http://www.tgs-global.com/4/665/fatca-astatus-report (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
65 Reporting Unauthorized Disclosure or Misuse of Tax Information Exchanged Under an International
Agreement, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/reporting-unauthorizeddisclosure-or-misuse-of-tax-information-exchanged-under-an-international-agreement (last updated Jan. 26,
2017).
66 I.R.S. News Release, supra note 53.
67 Letter from Frank Keating, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Am. Bankers Ass’n, to Timothy Geithner,
Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, et al., (Dec. 12, 2012) http://www.aba.com/Advocacy/
LetterstoCongress/Documents/ABANRALetter-USMexicoIGA121212.pdf.
64
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narcotics trafficking to also evaluate countries’ tax administration for bona
fides and protection of information.
OECD Peer Review System for Information Exchange
The OECD has stressed that its two key streams of work in relation to the
new Standard on Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) are monitoring
its implementation and helping developing countries to benefit from it. With
regard to the monitoring, the Global Forum established its AEOI Group,
formed in 2013 as a voluntary group and comprising almost sixty Global
Forum jurisdictions and three Global Forum observers. 68 The Group is tasked
with creating a mechanism for monitoring and reviewing the implementation
of the new standard. 69
Work commenced in 2014 for the creation of new terms of reference and a
new methodology, which allows for Global Forum member and relevant nonmember jurisdictions to be evaluated for the effectiveness of the
implementation, including the meeting of confidentiality and data safeguard
requirements. These reviews are aimed at ensuring a globally consistent
implementation of the standard. According to the outcomes of the Global
Forum meeting held in Berlin in October 2014, the Global Forum planned to
develop over 2015 the detailed terms of reference and methodology. 70 As of
the Global Forum meeting held in Barbados October 29–30, 2015, the Global
Forum completed 215 peer reviews and assigned compliance ratings to eightysix jurisdictions that have undergone Phase 2 reviews. 71 The Global Forum
now has 135 members of which ninety-eight have signed the Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and eighty-three have signed
the multilateral competent authority agreement for automatic exchange of
information. 72

68 The Role of the Global Forum, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/tax/
automatic-exchange/commitment-and-monitoring-process/role-of-the-global-forum/ (last visited Jan. 26,
2017).
69 Id.
70 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES—STATEMENT OF OUTCOMES 28–29 OCTOBER 2014 at 3,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/statement-of-outcomes-gfberlin.pdf.
71 Jurisdictions That Have Undergone Only Phase 1 Reviews, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
(July 26, 2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GFratings.pdf.
72 CHENGDU, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SECRETARY GENERAL REPORT TO G20 FINANCE
MINISTERS (2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-secretary-general-tax-report-g20-finance-ministers-july2016.pdf.
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The OECD and G20 members agreed that, via peer review, jurisdictions
would be assessed against three objective criteria: implementation of the
Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR) standard, the implementation of
the AEOI standard, and joining the multilateral Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (multilateral Convention). To be
marked “cooperative” in terms of tax transparency, a jurisdiction must meet
two of these three criteria. 73
The Global Forum announced that it would start a second round of peer
reviews from July 2016 under additional terms of reference. 74 These additional
terms include an assessment criterion of the availability of beneficial
ownership information set out by the Financial Action Task Force standard as
well as its access by the tax authorities whereas previously the criterion only
referred to the availability of legal ownership and identity information of legal
entities and arrangements. 75 What is missing is a criterion requiring the
assessment of a government’s protection and limited use of information
received by exchange.

73

The USA will Avoid Being Cast as a Tax Haven—But That Brings the Whole Process Into Disrepute,
TAX RES. UK (July 22, 2016), http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2016/07/22/the-usa-will-avoid-being-casta-a-tax-haven-but-that-brings-the-whole-process-into-disrepute/.
74 Exchange of Information on Request, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/
tax/transparency/exchange-of-information-on-request/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
75 Id.

